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The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game
theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules
whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes,
we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with
another imitative rule. We find that, surprinsingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher
cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic
rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result
is robust in the space of 2× 2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.
Why individuals cooperate is a key problem in a wide
range of disciplines [1], being studied theoretically mainly
within the framework of evolutionary game theory [2].
One of the proposed mechanisms to explain cooperation
is network reciprocity [3], and so different population
structures are known to have an influence on the evo-
lutionary outcome of social dilemmas [4]. All these mod-
els incorporate some kind of evolutionary dynamics [5],
whose update rules may play a crucial role in the results.
For example, the well-known promotion of cooperation
in Prisoner’s Dilemma enforced by spatial lattices [6] is
linked to a particular non-stochastic rule (unconditional
imitation), and this effect is greatly reduced if another
dynamics, imitative but stochastic, is employed [7].
Imitation is a well-known feature of human behavior
[8, 9]. By an imitative dynamics we understand an up-
date rule that makes individuals copy, within certain con-
straints, the strategy of those other players that are doing
better, or, in game theoretical terms, that are obtaining
higher payoffs from the game. In the case of network reci-
procity, the range of individuals that every player takes
into account is limited to her nearest neighbors on the
network. Two of the most frequently used imitative dy-
namics in the literature are the unconditional imitation
rule and the replicator rule [4]. In the former, individ-
uals acquire the strategy of the player with the maxi-
mum payoff in their neighborhood including themselves
[6]. In the latter, players choose a neighbor at random
and copy her strategy with probability proportional to
the difference of payoffs, provided the neighbor’s payoff
is greater than hers. It can be proven [10] that in large
well-mixed populations this last rule induces an evolu-
tionary dynamics equal to the replicator equation, thus
leading the population to asymptotic states very closely
related to the evolutionary stable equilibria of the game
[5]. In structured populations, though, the evolution-
ary outcome may greatly differ from the equilibria of the
game [4], and different evolutionary dynamics can yield
very different results, as in the example above. There-
fore, it is very relevant to study the dependence of the
promotion of cooperation on the evolutionary rules and
their robustness against perturbations.
In this work, we focus on this issue within the frame-
work of unconditional imitation and spatial lattices. It
may be argued that sometimes individuals can be able to
identify the strategy of all their neighbors and correctly
assess their earnings, but it is difficult to assume that
all this complex process may proceed without errors or
disturbances. Indeed, previous work has pursued this en-
quiry, using a Moran-like rule with weighted probabilities
[11], finding a progressive lowering of the cooperation lev-
els as the rule differs from unconditional imitation. Here
we use a different approach, which consists in stochas-
tically combining unconditional imitation with another
less demanding imitative rule. Thus, when an individ-
ual is to update her strategy, she follows unconditional
imitation with probability 1−ρ and the other rule with
probability ρ (the other rule is the replicator rule, unless
stated otherwise). The resulting evolutionary rule, which
we call the ρ-rule in the following, is local and imitative,
and the parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] measures the perturbation
introduced. Notice that this setting differs from a muta-
tion scheme, as the players do not acquire indefinitely, or
until the next mutation, the secondary rule.
We have studied computationally the outcome of the
ρ-rule with 2×2 symmetric games, which are games with
2 players who choose between 2 strategies, with no dif-
ference in role. We use the following parametrization of
the payoff matrix [7, 12]
C D
C
D
(
1 S
T 0
)
,
(1)
where rows represent the strategy (C for cooperate and
D for defect) of the player who obtains the payoff and
columns that of her opponent. Restricting parameters
to the square −1 < S < 1, 0 < T < 2, we have
the Harmony game [13] (0 < S, T < 1) and three
classic social dilemmas: the Prisoner’s Dilemma [14]
(−1 < S < 0, 1 < T < 2), the Stag Hunt game [15]
(−1 < S < 0 < T < 1), and the Hawk-Dove [16] or
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FIG. 1: Asymptotic density of cooperators x∗ in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (S = −0.7, T = 1.1), as a function of ρ, with
synchronous (filled squares) or asynchronous (empty squares)
update. Population size N = 104 individuals, arranged on a
square lattice with 8 neighbors and periodic boundary condi-
tions. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5, randomly dis-
tributed. Simulation time is 104 generations. The asymptotic
values are obtained as the mean over the last 103 generations,
averaged over 100 realizations. Inset: Results with popula-
tion sizes N = 2500 (triangles down), N = 104 (squares)
and N = 4.104 (triangles up). The results for N = 104 and
N = 4.104 are virtually identical, and all three are very simi-
lar for ρ > 0.2. Lines are a guide to the eye.
Snowdrift game [17] (0 < S < 1 < T < 2). There-
fore each game corresponds to a unit square in the ST -
plane. We have considered square lattices with 4- and 8-
neighborhoods, doing the update synchronously (all play-
ers play and then they simultaneously update their strat-
egy) or asynchronously (players play and update their
strategy sequentially in random order).
Figure 1 displays an example of the nontrivial behavior
obtained with the ρ-rule, showing the asymptotic frac-
tion of cooperators x∗ as a function of the probability ρ,
for a Prisoner’s Dilemma of parameters S = −0.7 and
T = 1.1. With this game, both ρ = 0 (unconditional
imitation) and ρ = 1 (replicator rule) result in full de-
fection, but a large range of values of ρ yield almost full
cooperation. This phenomenon resembles resonance-like
behavior found in other game-theoretical models [18, 19],
although in this case the effect is very large and occurs
for a wide range of ρ.
The explanation of this counter-intuitive result lies
in the different microscopic dynamical processes, with
greatly differing timescales, that the update rules induce,
something that is known to sometimes stabilize transients
yielding paradoxical outcomes, like in the famous Par-
rondo’s games [20, 21, 22]. In this case, both rules en-
hance cooperation by means of the formation and growth
of clusters of cooperators [6]. With unconditional imita-
tion clusters grow rapidly and mostly with flat interfaces,
whereas with the replicator rule clusters grow much more
slowly and have much rougher interfaces [7]. Let us con-
sider a flat interface of opposing cooperators and defec-
tors in a 8-neighbor lattice, as depicted in Fig. 2(a). With
unconditional imitation (ρ = 0) defectors at the bound-
ary become cooperators if 5+3S > 3T . Otherwise the in-
terface remains frozen, and clusters of cooperators are not
able to grow. With the replicator rule (ρ = 1), coopera-
tors at the boundary become, with a certain probability,
defectors and the interface roughens progressively. When
ρ > 0 the flat interface slowly becomes rougher because
of those players that happen to follow the replicator rule,
and then nearby defectors that happen to follow uncondi-
tional imitation rapidly become cooperators precisely be-
cause of the irregularities at the interface. For example,
starting from the flat interface in Fig. 2(a) a cooperator
will use the replicator rule and compare payoff with one
of the opposing defectors with probability 3ρ/8, becom-
ing with some probability a defector [Fig. 2(b)]. If this
player follows unconditional imitation in the next update
she will switch back to cooperation. If not, with a certain
probability, one of the nearby defectors becomes herself a
cooperator, using again the replicator rule, thus produc-
ing the kink of Fig. 2(c). This configuration is critical be-
cause if nearby defectors follow unconditional imitation
in the next time steps, they will immediately become co-
operators, and the interface will advance one step to the
right [Figs. 2(d,e)]. Simulations show this kind of growth
process, where irregularities at interfaces of clusters ap-
pear in configurations similar to that of Fig. 2 and also
in cluster corners, giving rise to cascades of conversions
from defectors to cooperators along the interfaces.
As is typical for dynamics driven by unconditional im-
itation [7], the population ends up in full cooperation as
long as there are, at initial time, small clusters of coop-
erators that resist defector invasion and grow. Greater
population sizes mean larger probabilities of these clus-
ters to occur, and so there is a dependence on system size
in the region close to ρ = 0 (inset of Fig. 1). Note also
that the time of convergence diverges in the limit ρ→ 0,
because the interface instabilities explained above take
place with a probability proportional to ρ2.
The fact that this mechanism is rooted in the basic mi-
croscopic processes that the update rules cause is a hint
that it should occur with other games where these pro-
cesses are also known to take place [6, 7]. Figures 3(a-e)
illustrate this point, displaying the asymptotic fraction of
cooperators in the same network topology than Fig. 1, for
different values of ρ and in the games introduced above:
Harmony (upper left square), Stag Hunt (lower left),
Snowdrift (upper right) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (lower
right). To have a measure of the global influence on each
kind of game, each square displays the average value of
the asymptotic fraction of cooperators achieved in it. No-
tice how the transition between full cooperation and full
defection of Fig. 3(a) advances in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
square for intermediate values of ρ. With unconditional
imitation (ρ = 0) this boundary is given by the payoff
equality between cooperators and defectors at both sides
of a flat interface [6], which for the setting of Fig. 3(a) cor-
responds to T − S = 5/3. With 0 < ρ≪ 1 [Figs. 3(b,c)],
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FIG. 2: Flat interface evolution, with synchronous update, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma of Fig. 1 and ρ > 0. Each position shows
the strategy and payoff of a player. Cooperators are depicted in red and defectors in blue. Changes of strategy made under
unconditional imitation are labeled with UI, and those under the replicator rule with REP.
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FIG. 3: Asymptotic fraction of cooperators, for different social dilemmas defined by S and T , as ρ varies from 0 to 1. The
population is arranged on a square lattice [first row, panels (a) to (e)] or a Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [second row,
panels (f) to (j)], both of mean degree equal to 8. The update is synchronous. Remaining parameters are as in Fig. 1.
this boundary is instead given by 2T − S = 3, which
is precisely the condition for the payoff equality of the
players who determine the start of cascades at the inter-
faces, namely the players on third row, second and third
columns, of Fig. 2(c). Note also that the transition line
at T = 8/5, which determines the instability of inwards
corners of cooperators [6], is preserved for ρ > 0, and
that a new line appears at T = 4/3, which gives the con-
dition under which the irregularities of cluster interfaces,
caused by the replicator rule, trigger a defector invasion
under unconditional imitation (compare the payoff of the
defector at fifth row and second column of Fig. 2(c) with
that of a cooperator two positions to the left).
Considering other stochastic imitative rules to be used
in the ρ-rule, like the multiple replicator or the Moran
rules [4, 7], does not significantly change the results. In
fact, any imitative local rule that destabilizes the inter-
faces of clusters of cooperators and that works on a slower
timescale than unconditional imitation (as expected for
stochastic rules) will produce qualitatively similar re-
sults. We have found this phenomenon even with a ran-
dom local rule (players just adopt the strategy of one
randomly chosen neighbor), providing that ρ ≪ 1. The
effect is also robust against changes in the degree of the
network and is found with synchronous and asynchronous
update.
Another important variation to consider in this model
is that of the topology of the underlying network. Apart
from the clustering of spatial lattices [6], the degree het-
erogeneity of scale-free networks is another topological
property known to have an important impact on the evo-
lution of cooperation [12]. In consequence, we have also
studied the evolutionary outcome that the ρ-rule yields
on populations structured according to Baraba´si-Albert
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FIG. 4: Average asymptotic cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma 〈x∗〉PD, as a function of ρ. Populations are dis-
tributed on square lattices (a) or scale-free networks (b),
both of mean degree = 8. The update is synchronous (filled
squares) or asynchronous (empty squares). Remaining pa-
rameters are as in Fig. 1. Notice the different scales of 〈x∗〉PD
in (a) and (b).
scale-free networks [23]. The results are presented in
Figs. 3(f-j).
From the point of view of the evolution of cooperation
Fig. 3 shows that, for a large range of ρ, practically full
cooperation is obtained in Stag Hunt (Snowdrift) games
on spatial (scale-free) networks. Very importantly, with
the ρ-rule the population achieves full cooperation pre-
cisely in those games where the underlying population
structure has its greatest impact. Regarding the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, we have studied the average asymptotic
cooperation 〈x∗〉PD in the corresponding unit square, ob-
taining the results shown in Fig. 4, both for spatial lat-
tices (a) and scale-free networks (b). Interestingly, some
differences appear depending on the synchronicity of the
update. With synchronous update, a maximum average
cooperation is achieved for an optimum ρ, whereas for
asynchronous update the result is rather a plateau over
a large range of ρ. On spatial lattices the differences
are small, but on scale-free networks they are strikingly
large, specially for ρ ≪ 1. We have shown elsewhere [7]
that, with spatial lattices, unconditional imitation is the
only rule that yields different results depending on the
synchronicity of the update, but to our knowledge this
large sensitivity in the case of scale-free networks has not
been reported in the literature and so it deserves further
investigation.
In conclusion, we have introduced an evolutionary rule
that allows to relax the demanding requirements of the
unconditional imitation rule, while maintaining the basic
properties of imitative behavior and local information.
We have found that, for a wide range of ρ, the coop-
eration levels that it yields are not only preserved but
in many cases they are even enhanced. This conclusion
is general and independent of the details of the model;
hence the reported mechanism might have an impact on
many other evolutionary games. This work thus offers a
new perspective on the significance of imitative dynam-
ics, in general, and unconditional imitation, in particular:
Instead of considering the promotion of cooperation ad-
scribed to this rule as a singularity, we can now see it as
a more robust outcome. Finally, and from a more general
viewpoint, this result belongs to a wider class of paradox-
ical behaviors originated in the stabilization of transients
by the combination of two dynamics, Parrondo’s paradox
being the best known example [20, 21, 22].
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